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Martin	Loughlin	and	the	tragic	politics	of	public	law	
	Panu	Minkkinen	Faculty	of	Law,	University	of	Helsinki		Introduction		 The	starting-point	that	I	have	chosen	is	a	claim	that	Loughlin’s	body	of	work,	extending	from	The	Idea	of	Public	Law,	through	to	Foundations	and	beyond,	is	not	merely	nominally	foundationalist,	but	is	also	foundationalist	in	its	aspirations.1	Loughlin	states	in	his	introduction	that	Foundations	is	an	’exercise	in	retrieval’	in	the	sense	that	its	objective	is	to	’rediscover	the	earlier	discourse	on	political	right	and	assess	its	relevance	in	the	contemporary	world’.2	This	is	only	a	half-truth	because	Foundations	not	only	’rediscovers’	and	’assesses’	something,	but	it	also	—	and	perhaps	even	for	the	most	part	—	’refounds’	whatever	it	has	found.	It	’reconstitutes’	its	object	of	study,	perhaps	even	’constitutionalizes’	it.	3		From	the	very	start,	Foundations	is	a	book	about	instauration,	about	lost	origins	and	the	possibility	of	their	reestablishment	in	only	slightly	modified	ways.	Throughout	the	course	of	its	chapters	—	which	make	up	a	genuine	tour	de	
force	in	the	history	of	ideas	—	Foundations,	then,	aspires	to	re-establish	an	earlier	understanding	of	public	law,	one	that	crosses	historical	eras	as	easily	as	it	does	jurisdictional	borders.	The	essential	characteristic	of	this	particular	understanding	of	public	law	is,	as	Loughlin	frequently	emphasizes,	that	it	is	a	’science	of	political	right’.	Loughlin’s	foundationalism	thus	seeks	to	overcome	or	at	least	to	deflate	the	binary	opposition	between	science	and	politics.	On	the	one	hand,	like	The	Idea	before	it,	Foundations,	or,	rather,	the	theory	in	which	both	books	take	part,	subscribes	to	a	certain	’Kantianesque’	epistemology	that	Loughlin	shorthands	as	’pure	theory’.’Kantianesque’	because	it	isn’t	always	clear	which	Critique	is	the	engine.	Although	Hans	Kelsen	himself	does	not																																																																					1	Martin	Loughlin,	The	Idea	of	Public	Law	(Oxford	University	Press:	Oxford,	2003).	Martin	Loughlin,	Foundations	of	Public	Law	(Oxford	University	Press:	Oxford,	2010).	In	addition	to	these	texts	see	e.g.	Martin	Loughlin,	'The	Nature	of	Public	Law',	in	Cormac	MacAmhlaigh,	Claudio	Michelon	and	Neil	Walker	(eds),	
After	Public	Law	(Oxford	University	Press:	Oxford,	2013)	11-24,	Martin	Loughlin,	'The	Concept	of	Constituent	Power',	13	European	Journal	of	Political	Theory	(2013)	218-237,	Martin	Loughlin,	'Modernism	in	British	Public	Law,	1919-79',	
Public	Law	(2014)	56-67,	Martin	Loughlin,	'The	Constitutional	Imagination',	78	
The	Modern	Law	Review	(2015)	1-25	2	Loughlin,	Foundations,	at	10.	3	Martin	Loughlin,	'What	is	Constitutionalisation?',	in	Petra	Dobner	and	Martin	Loughlin	(eds),	The	Twilight	of	Constitutionalism?	(Oxford	University	Press:	Oxford,	2010)	47-69.	
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configure	prominently	in	this	particular	book,	and	although	the	few	references	to	’purity’	are	restricted	to	the	introduction,4	one	has	to	ask	why	Loughlin	has	decided	to	hold	on	to	such	a	laden	term.	The	answer	may	be	fairly	simple.	
Foundations	is	part	of	a	scientific	theory,	an	epithet	that	Loughlin	cultivates	with	a	certain	sense	of	defiance	despite	all	its	misleading	connotations	in	the	English	language.5	On	the	other	hand,	the	discipline	of	public	law	that	Foundations	represents	—	or,	rather,	that	it	seeks	to	re-establish	—	is	a	scientific	theory	on	the	political	dimension	of	a	legal	phenomenon.	This	is	how	Foundations	runs	into	the	antinomy	that	it	needs,	if	not	to	resolve,	then	at	least	to	appease.	Loughlin	can’t	simply	ignore	the	fact	that,	sensu	stricto,	there	can	be	no	epistemologically	purified	theory	of	the	political,	that	is,	a	pure	theory	that	could	somehow	distance	itself	appropriately	from	the	political	right	that	it	wishes	to	study,	at	least	not	if	we	are	to	understand	politics	in	the	way	Loughlin	does.	And	Loughlin	concedes	at	the	outset	that	a	science	of	political	right	is	’strictly	speaking	…	unachievable’6	and	that	its	irreconcilable	antimony	can	only	be	’negotiated’7	through	prudential	judgement.	Hence	the	approach	is	characterised	as	’political	jurisprudence’,	that	is,	a	prudential	stance	in	relation	to	law	and	politics.8	By	’prudentially	negotiating’	this	irreconcilable	antinomy,	Loughlin	arrives	at	a	very	particular	understanding	of	politics	as	’government’.	In	Swords	and	Scales	Loughlin	had	already	specified	politics	as	the	way	in	which	humans	resolve	disputes	’by	self-reflection	and	deliberation	on	the	appropriate	pattern	of	collective	life’.9	This	specification	is	a	choice,	or	a	normative	preference	that	frames	the	whole	theory.	Foundations	itself	does	not	discuss	‘the	political’	in	much	detail.	In	his	introduction10,	and	in	various	sections	of	the	book,	Loughlin	does,	however,	specify	that	the	new	element	in	Foundations	is	its	two-fold	understanding	of	political	power	as	both	that	which	is	contained	and	that	which,	in	its	very	containment,	enables.	To	view	public	law	through	the	normativist	lens	of	legal	positivism	will	capture	well	the	institutional	competences	into	which	power	has	been	contained,	something	that	Loughlin	elsewhere	calls	’negative	constitutionalism’11.	But	contained	and	simultaneously	institutionalized,	power																																																																					4	Save	one	that	Loughlin	somewhat	misleadingly	annexes	to	his	discussion	of	Kant’s	practical	reason.	See	Loughlin,	Foundations,	at	130-131.	5	On	the	German	tradition	of	’legal	science’	and	its	significance,	see	e.g.	Martin	Loughlin,	'In	defence	of	Staatslehre',	48	Der	Staat	(2009)	1-28.	6	Loughlin,	Foundations,	at	11.	7	Loughlin,	Foundations,	at	11.	8	See	‘Political	Jurisprudence’,	this	volume.	See	also	Loughlin,	The	Idea,	at	163.	9	Martin	Loughlin,	Sword	and	Scales.		An	Examination	of	the	Relationship	
between	Law	and	Politics	(Hart:	Oxford,	2000),	at	7.	10	Loughlin,	Foundations,	at	11-12.	11	Loughlin,	"The	Constitutional	Imagination",	at	17.	
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also	takes	on	a	’positive	constitutionalist’	dimension.	In	Foundations,	Loughlin’s	definition	of	this	enabling	dimension	of	political	power	is	the	following:		Political	power	is	a	special	type	of	power	created	by	the	drawing	together	of	people	in	a	common	undertaking.	This	type	of	power	is	founded	on	the	’consent’	of	the	people,	is	rooted	in	trust,	and	is	generated	through	the	imposition	of	controls	and	checks	on	those	who	hold	positions	of	authority.	In	this	sense,	political	power	is	created	through	the	ways	in	which	governing	power	is	institutionalized.12		For	Loughlin,	what	makes	power	’political’	is,	then,	a	’common	undertaking’	that	has	the	ability	to	collect	individuals	together	into	something	resembling	a	’people’.	It	is	this	’consensual’	understanding	of	politics	that	I	would	like	to	contest.		Loughlin	has	already	responded	to	a	similar	critique	elsewhere.13	But	my	focus	is	slightly	different.	I	will	explicate	my	reservations	about	Loughlin’s	understanding	of	politics	by	contrasting	it	with	two	’agonistic’	alternatives:	with	Claude	Lefort’s	notion	of	’the	political’,14	and	Jacques	Rancière’s	understanding	of	politics	as	’dissensus’.15	Both	Lefort	and	Rancière	play	a	certain,	albeit	very	minor,	role	in	the	overall	development	of	Loughlin’s	theory.	But	unlike	Loughlin,	they	approach	the	political	phenomenon	with	a	certain	’embeddedness’	that	I	will	call	’metapolitical’.16		
																																																																				12	Loughlin,	Foundations,	at	11-12.	13	Mainly	I	am	referring	to	Emilios	Christodoulidis’s	observations	about	The	
Idea	in	Emilios	Christodoulidis,	'Public	Law	as	Political	Jurisprudence:	Loughlin's	"Idea	of	Public	Law*',	in	Emilios	Christodoulidis	and	Stephen	Tierney	(eds),	
Public	Law	and	Politics.	The	Scope	and	Limits	of	Constitutionalism	(Ashgate:	Aldershot,	2008)	35-45,	and	Loughlin’s	reply	in	Martin	Loughlin,	'Reflections	on	
The	Idea	of	Public	Law',	in	Emilios	Christodoulidis	and	Stephen	Tierney	(eds),	
Public	Law	and	Politics.	The	Scope	and	Limits	of	Constitutionalism	(Ashgate:	Aldershot,	2008)	47-66.	14	Claude	Lefort,	The	Political	Forms	of	Modern	Society.	Bureaucracy,	
Democracy,	Totalitarianism	(Alan	Sheridan	et	al	trans.,	Polity:	Cambridge,	1986),	Claude	Lefort,	Democracy	and	Political	Theory	(David	Macey	trans.,	Polity:	Cambridge,	1988).	15	Jacques	Rancière,	Disagreement.	Politics	and	Philosophy	(Julie	Rose	trans.,	University	of	Minnesota	Press:	Minneapolis,	MI,	1998),	Jacques	Rancière,	
Dissensus.	On	Politics	and	Aesthetics	(Steven	Corcoran	trans.,	Continuum:	London,	2009).	16	See	e.g.	Alain	Badiou,	Metapolitics	(Jason	Barker	trans.,	Verso:	London,	2011),	Rancière,	Disagreement,	at	81-90.	
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Pierre	Bourdieu	once	commented	on	the	’improbability’	of	sociology	as	a	science	by	pointing	out	to	how	sociologists	are	always	’at	stake’	in	their	own	objects	of	research.17	This,	I	would	add,	is	true	of	all	the	human	sciences.	In	other	words,	the	knowledge	that	’science’	produces	about	politics	participates	in	the	
lifeworld	phenomenon	of	politics	that	it	studies,	even	when	politics	is	understood	in	agonistic	or	polemical	terms.	This	is	what	I	mean	by	‘metapolitical’	as	a	political	account	of	the	political.	Schmitt,	to	take	the	example	closest	to	Loughlin,	cannot	present	his	friend-enemy	distinction18	as	an	epistemologically	’purified’	a	
priori	conceptual	binary	that	precedes	the	act	of	it	being	made.	Making	the	distinction	is	a	political	act	in	itself,	a	’polemical	intervention’	that	discerns	(krinein,	ent-scheiden)	the	opposites	and,	in	Schmitt’s	case,	by	so	doing	also	nominates	and	publicizes	its	own	’enemy’,	that	is,	a	divisionless	and	hence	seemingly	depoliticized	liberal	legal	science.	This	is	where	I	find	Loughlin	falling	short.	By	trying	to	formulate	political	right	as	a	’science	of	the	political’,	the	theory	ends	up	in	the	’negotiated’	territory	that	is	’government’,	which	strictly	speaking	is	neither	’scientific’	nor	’political’.	The	alternative	would	be	to	work	out	something	resembling	a	’metapolitics	of	public	law’,	as	intimated	by	Rancière.	I	conclude	by	reviewing	Loughlin’s	position	through	the	lens	of	Max	Weber’s	’vocation	lectures’.19	As	with	Weber,	Loughlin’s	attempt	to	’negotiate’	the	opposition	of	science	and	politics	through	’government’	gives	the	theory	a	’tragic’	character.	I	will	finally	elaborate	on	this	tragic	element	with	the	help	of	Massimo	Cacciari.20		
'The	whirlwind	of	rights'	Claude	Lefort’s	name	comes	often	comes	up	in	discussions	about	politics,	from	Ernesto	Laclau	and	Chantal	Mouffe’s	critical	theory	of	the	hegemony	of	
																																																																				17	Pierre	Bourdieu,	Sociology	in	Question	(Richard	Nice	trans.,	Sage:	London,	1993),	at	9.	18	Carl	Schmitt,	The	Concept	of	the	Political	(originally	published	1927)	(George	Schwab	trans.,	Expanded	ed.	edn,	University	of	Chicago	Press:	Chicago,	IL,	2007).	19	The	classic	’anti-Parsonsian’	translations	by	Hans	Gerth	and	C.	Wright	Mills	have	been	published	as	Max	Weber,	'Politics	as	a	Vocation'	(originally	published	1919),	in	Max	Weber,	From	Max	Weber:	Essays	in	Sociology	(Hans	Heinrich	Gerth	and	C	Wrigth	Mills	trans.,	New	ed.	edn,	Routledge:	Abingdon,	2009)	77-128	and	Max	Weber,	'Science	as	a	Vocation'	(originally	published	1917),	in	Max	Weber,	
From	Max	Weber.	Essays	in	Sociology	(Hans	Heinrich	Gerth	and	C	Wrigth	Mills	trans.,	New	ed.	edn,	Routledge:	Abingdon,	2009)	129-156.	20	Massimo	Cacciari,	'Weber	and	the	Politician	as	Tragic	Hero',	in	Massimo	Cacciari,	The	Unpolitical:	On	the	Radical	Critique	of	Political	Reason	(Massimo	Verdicchio	trans.,	Fordham	University	Press:	New	York,	2009)	206-238.	
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radical	democracy21	to	the	post-Heideggerian	analyses	of	Philippe	Lacoue-Labarthe	and	Jean-Luc	Nancy.22	The	main	reason	is	the	distinction	that	he	popularized	between	le	politique	or	politics	as	a	form	of	regime,	usually	translated	as	’the	political’,	and	la	politique	or	politics	understood	as	social	agency,	conflict-ridden	by	opposing	and	often	irreconcilable	interests,	usually	translated	simply	as	’politics’.23	While	’politics’	in	the	latter	sense	can	be	understood	as	the	antagonist	competition	for	power	in	all	of	its	usual	guises,	Lefort’s	‘the	political’	is,	in	turn,	the	way	in	which	a	given	society	represents	its	own	unity	to	itself	as	a	collectivity.	Commenting	on	Raymond	Aron,	whose	radical	liberalism	is	a	major	source	of	inspiration	here,24	Lefort	notes	how	the	term	’the	political’	is	used	in	at	least	two	ways:		In	a	first	meaning,	this	term	designates	a	particular	domain	of	the	social	ensemble;	it	delimits	the	source	of	authority,	the	conditions	and	means	of	its	exercise,	and	the	range	of	its	competences.	In	a	second	meaning,	the	political	refers	to	the	social	ensemble	itself,	for	the	entire	collectivity	is	affected	by	conceptions	of	the	nature	of	power	and	the	mode	of	the	exercise	of	government.	…	decisions	made	at	the	top	have	repercussions	in	all	domains	of	social	life	but	also	…	the	representation	of	authority	in	the	particular	sector	of	politics	circulates	in	some	manner	throughout	the	social	ensemble.	It	is	in	this	second	sense	that	it	becomes	relevant	to	affirm	a	’primacy	of	the	political,’	no	matter	the	society	under	consideration.25		
																																																																				21	Ernesto	Laclau	and	Chantal	Mouffe,	Hegemony	and	Socialist	Strategy.	
Towards	a	Radical	Democratic	Politics	(originally	published	1985)	(2nd	ed.	edn,	Verso:	London,	2001)	22	Philippe	Lacoue-Labarthe	and	Jean-Luc	Nancy,	Retreating	the	Political	(Simon	Sparks	trans.,	Routledge:	London,	1997).	23	See	also	Martin	Plot	(ed),	Claude	Lefort:	Thinker	of	the	Political	(Palgrave	Macmillan:	Basingstoke,	2013).	On	the	discussion	more	generally,	see	Oliver	Marchart,	Post-Foundational	Political	Thought.	Political	Difference	in	Nancy,	
Lefort,	Badiou	and	Laclau	(Edinburgh	University	Press:	Edinburgh,	2007).	Warren	Breckman,	Adventures	of	the	Symbolic.	Post-Marxism	and	Radical	
Democracy	(Columbia	University	Press:	New	York,	2013),	at	139-182	in	particular,	and	Martin	Breaugh	and	others	(eds),	Thinking	Radical	Democracy.	
The	Return	to	Politics	in	Post-War	France	(University	of	Toronto	Press:	Toronto,	2015).	24	See	especially	Raymond	Aron,	Democracy	and	Totalitarianism	(originally	published	1965)	(Valence	Ionescu	trans.,	Weidenfeld	and	Nicolson:	London,	1968).	25	Claude	Lefort,	'The	Political	and	the	Social',	in	Claude	Lefort,	Complications.	
Communism	and	the	Dilemmas	of	Democracy	(Julian	Bourg	trans.,	Columbia	University	Press:	New	York,	2007)	113-123,	at	113-114.	
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Drawing	on	both	the	phenomenology	of	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty26	and	the	psychoanalytic	theory	of	Piera	Aulagnier,27	Lefort	maintains	that	’the	political’	not	only	shapes	(mise-en-forme)	collective	life	into	more	or	less	permanent	social	relations,	but	that	it	also	stages	(mise-en-scène)	individual	interpretations	of	those	relations.	Only	collective	relations	and	individual	interpretations	can	together	provide	form	and	meaning	(mise-en-sens).28	The	dimensions	of	’politics’	and	’the	political’	are	interwoven	into	one	another	in	the	sense	that	the	antagonistic	or	conflictual	element	of	political	action	is	always	reflected	in	society’s	representation	of	itself,	and	vice	versa.	Neither	dimension	can	exist	independently	of	the	other.	The	two	modern	political	’regimes’	that	Lefort	has	elaborated	in	detail,	namely	totalitarianism	and	democracy,	share	a	kinship,	but	operate	in	diametrically	opposite	ways.	In	both,	’the	political’	functions	as	a	symbolic	constitution	in	so	far	as	it	locates	society’s	unity	in	a	particular	point	of	power.	As	regimes,	both	totalitarianism	and	democracy	attempt	to	resolve	the	same	problem,	namely	to	come	to	terms	with	the	empty	space	that	has	been	left	behind	once	the	claim	to	the	transcendental	nature	of	the	King’s	divine	power	has	lost	its	capacity	to	represent	the	corporeal	unity	of	the	body	politic.	Following	the	symbolic	decapitation	of	the	monarch	and	the	dissolution	of	the	kingdom	that	he	represented,	power	appears	as	an	empty	space.	Democracy,	Lefort	maintains,	leaves	that	space	empty.	In	the	absence	of	kings,	those	who	exercise	power	can	only	be	mortals	who	occupy	its	positions	temporarily	or	who	can	invest	themselves	in	it	only	by	force	or	by	cunning.	Unity	is	unable	to	efface	
																																																																				26	Especially	the	posthumous	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty,	The	Visible	and	the	
Invisible.	Followed	by	Working	Notes	(originally	published	1964)	(Alphonso	Lingis	trans.,	Northwestern	University	Press:	Evanston,	1968),	edited	by	Lefort	himself.	Lefort’s	affiliation	with	his	phenomenologist	mentor	is	analyzed	in	detail	in	Bernard	Flynn,	The	Philosophy	of	Claude	Lefort.	Interpreting	the	Political	(Northwestern	University	Press:	Evanston,	2005).	On	Merleau-Ponty’s	late	philosophy	and	law,	see	William	S.	Hamrick,	An	Existential	Phenomenology	of	
Law:	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	(Springer:	Dordrecht,	1987).	27	E.g.	Piera	Aulagnier,	The	Violence	of	Interpretation.	From	Pictogram	to	
Statement	(originally	published	1975)	(Alan	Sheridan	trans.,	Brunner-Routledge:	Hove,	2001).	For	her	psychoanalytic	take	on	totalitarianism,	see	Piera	Aulagnier,	
L'apprenti-historien	et	le	maître-sorcier.	Du	discours	identifiant	au	discours	
délirant	(PUF:	Paris,	1993),	at	237-254.	Aulagnier,	originally	trained	by	Lacan,	was	at	one	point	married	to	Cornelius	Castoriadis,	Lefort’s	collaborator	from	the	
Socialisme	ou	Barbarie	period,	1947-1958.	See	Christos	Memos,	Castoriadis	and	
Critical	Theory.	Crisis,	Critique	and	Radical	Alternatives	(Palgrave	Macmillan:	Basingstoke,	2014),	at	26-45.	28	Claude	Lefort,	'The	Permanence	of	the	Theologico-Political?',	in	Claude	Lefort,	Democracy	and	Political	Theory	(Polity:	Cambridge,	1988)	213-255,	at	217-221.	
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social	division.	This	division	is,	Lefort	claims,	the	true	nature	of	democracy	as	a	political	regime:		Democracy	inaugurates	the	experience	of	an	ungraspable,	uncontrollable	society	in	which	the	people	will	be	said	to	be	sovereign,	of	course,	but	whose	identity	will	constantly	be	open	to	question,	whose	identity	will	remain	latent.29		In	other	words,	the	antagonistic	and	conflictual	nature	of	’politics’,	keeping	the	symbolic	space	of	power	empty,	is	what	characterizes	‘the	political’	of	the	democratic	regime.	Totalitarianism,	on	the	other	hand,	is	an	attempt	to	fill	that	space,	to	unify	society	by	placing	society	itself	in	the	empty	space	left	behind	after	the	regicide	and	dissolution	of	the	body	politic.	With	violence	and	repression,	totalitarianism	attempts	to	’weld	power	and	society	back	together	again,	to	efface	all	signs	of	social	division,	to	banish	the	indetermination	that	haunts	the	democratic	experience’30,	or,	in	other	words,	to	abolish	the	’politics’	that	would	maintain	the	emptiness	of	that	space.	This	also	has	a	constitutional	dimension.	Lefort’s	democratic	state:		goes	beyond	the	limits	traditionally	assigned	to	the	état	de	droit.	It	tests	out	rights	which	have	not	yet	been	incorporated	in	it,	it	is	the	theatre	of	a	contestation,	whose	object	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	preservation	of	a	tacitly	established	pact	but	which	takes	form	in	centres	that	power	cannot	entirely	master.31		Democracy	is,	then,	the	form	of	society	in	which	the	relationship	of	law	to	power	is	always	external.	In	this	’savage	democracy’,	law	is,	as	Miguel	Abensour	explains,	no	longer	thought	of	as	an	instrument	of	social	conservation,	but	as	a	revolutionary	source	of	authority	for	a	society	that	constitutes	itself	as	the	indeterminate	entity	it	is	and	will	always	be.	In	this	sense,	law	is	always	in	excess	of	what	it	has	established,	and	once	constituted,	the	constituent	force	will	always	reemerge	in	order	to	both	reaffirm	existing	rights	and	to	create	new	ones:		A	political	stage	opens	according	to	which	there	is	a	struggle	between	the	domestication	of	rights	and	its	permanent	destabilization-recreation	via	the																																																																					29	Claude	Lefort,	'The	Image	of	the	Body	and	Totalitarianism',	in	Claude	Lefort,	The	Political	Forms	of	Modern	Society.	Bureaucracy,	Democracy,	
Totalitarianism	(Alan	Sheridan	et	al	trans.,	Polity:	Cambridge,	1986)	292-306,	at	303-304.	30	Lefort,	'The	Image	of	the	Body	and	Totalitarianism',	at	305.	31	Lefort,	'Politics	and	Human	Rights',	at	258.	
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integration	of	new	rights,	new	demands	that	are	henceforth	considered	as	legitimate.	According	to	Lefort,	it	is	the	existence	of	this	incessantly	reborn	protest,	this	whirlwind	of	rights,	that	brings	democracy	beyond	the	traditional	limits	of	the	’State	of	right’	[État	de	droit,	Rechtsstaat].32		A	droit	politique	indeed	in	the	sense	that	for	Lefort	human	rights	—	and	even	rights	more	generally	—	demand	specifically	a	politics	of	human	rights,	equivalent	to	a	democratic	politics.	Lefort	cannot	accept	the	critique	of	the	early	Marx33	that	sees	rights	merely	as	a	consequence	of	the	decomposition	of	society	into	isolated	monadic	citizens.	Even	social	separation	is	a	modality	of	man’s	relation	to	others.	The	’state	of	right’,	as	Lefort	understands	it,	introduces	a	’disincorporation’	of	both	power	and	right	rather	than	their	complete	separation.	And	so	the	’state	of	right’	will	always	include	within	itself	an	’opposition	in	terms	of	right’:		The	rights	of	man	reduce	right	to	a	basis	which,	despite	its	name,	is	without	shape,	is	given	as	interior	to	itself	and,	for	this	reason,	eludes	all	power	which	would	claim	to	take	hold	of	it	whether	religious	or	mythical,	monarchical	or	popular.	Consequently,	these	rights	go	beyond	any	particular	formulation	which	has	been	given	of	them;	and	this	means	that	their	formulation	contains	the	demand	for	their	reformulation,	or	that	acquired	rights	are	not	necessarily	called	upon	to	support	new	rights.34		Of	the	’agonists’	discussed	here,	Lefort	is,	perhaps,	initially	the	furthest	from	Loughlin.	This	might	be	due	to	Lefort’s	phenomenological	framework,	which	grates	with	Loughlin’s	more	formal	approach.	In	Foundations,	Loughlin	does	mention	Lefort	in	passing	while	discussing	the	political	theology	of	medieval	and	modern	constitutionalism:		
																																																																				32	Miguel	Abensour,	'Appendix:	"Savage	Democracy"	and	the	"Principle	of	Anarchy"',	in	Miguel	Abensour,	Democracy	against	the	State.	Marx	and	the	
Machiavellian	Moment	(Max	Blechman	and	Martin	Breaugh	trans.,	Polity:	Cambridge,	2011)	102-124,	at	108,	translation	modified.	33	See	Karl	Marx,	'On	the	Jewish	Question'	(originally	published	1844),	in	Karl	Marx,	Marx.	Early	political	writings	(Joseph	O'Malley	and	Richard	A.	Davis	trans.,	Cambridge	University	Press:	Cambridge,	1994)	28-56.	34	Lefort,	'Politics	and	Human	Rights',	at	258.	See	also	Claude	Lefort,	'Human	Rights	and	the	Welfare	State',	in	Claude	Lefort,	Democracy	and	Political	Theory	(David	Macey	trans.,	Polity	Press:	Cambridge,	1988)	21-44,	Claude	Lefort,	'International	Law,	Human	Rights,	and	Politics',	22	Qui	Parle	(2013)	117-137	and	Flynn,	The	Philosophy	of	Claude	Lefort.	Interpreting	the	Political,	at	164-184.	
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When	Lefort	refers	to	the	modern	democratic	foundation	as	an	‘empty	place’,	it	is	precisely	because	there	is	no	longer	an	external	authority	that	underwrites	political	existence.35		To	my	mind,	Loughlin	here	misses	Lefort’s	point	about	the	relationship	between	the	empty	space	and	democracy.	For	Lefort,	democracy	is	not	merely	the	absence	of	an	external	authority	once	God	has	been	pronounced	dead.	Such	an	absence	would	simply	represent	the	post-theological	vacuum	from	which	both	totalitarianism	and	democracy	follow	as	archetypal	variations	of	modern	political	regimes.	If	totalitarianism	is	the	frenzied	attempt	to	fill	that	empty	space	with	unifying	structures	that	would	abolish	the	social	divisions	of	politics,	then	democracy	and	’right’,	by	contrast,	are	measured	by	their	ability	to	keep	that	space	empty.	In	Lefort’s	scheme,	democracy	and	’right’	are,	in	other	words,	marked	by	the	resistance	or	opposition	against	the	totalitarian	tendencies	of	modern	capitalism	to	fill	the	space,	and	the	name	of	that	resistance	is	’politics’.	But	in	a	more	recent	article	Loughlin	already	comes	closer.	He	notes:		Constituent	power	exists	only	insofar	as	it	resists	institutionalized	representation.	Claude	Lefort	notes	that	modern	democracy	leads	to	the	creation	of	the	‘empty	place’	of	the	political.	The	problem	is	not	that	it	is	empty,	but	that	the	space	is	crowded	with	the	many	who	claim	the	authentic	voice	of	constituent	power.	This	is	his	point:	legitimacy	must	be	claimed	in	the	name	of	the	people,	and	the	question	of	who	represents	the	people	remains	the	indeterminate	question	of	modern	politics.	The	function	of	constituent	power	is	to	keep	that	question	open,	not	least	because	‘the	people-as-one’	is	the	hallmark	of	totalitarianism.36		With	his	notion	of	constituent	power,	Loughlin	clearly	aligns	himself	with	Lefort’s	idea	of	the	political	of	democracy	as	an	empty	space	and	of	a	democratic	’constituent’	subject	whose	identity	is	constantly	kept	in	question.	But	unlike	Lefort,	Loughlin’s	’relationist	method’,	as	he	calls	it	in	this	instance,	is	more	concerned	with	resolving	a	normativist-decisionist	dispute	than	with	the	democratic	object	of	study.	By	’constitutionalizing’	the	political	domain,	by	bringing	the	order	of	government	to	the	’crowded	space’,	Loughlin’s	theory	runs	the	risk	of	promoting	what	Lefort	would	regard	as	the	totalitarian	tendencies	of	modern	capitalism	rather	than	putting	them	into	question.	Constitutionalization	fills	and	coagulates	the	space	of	politics.	My	point	here	is	not	that	this	would	be	a																																																																					35	Loughlin,	Foundations,	at	48.	36	Loughlin,	"The	Concept	of	Constituent	Power",	at	233-234,	reference	omitted.	The	article	includes	other	more	tacit	references	to	Lefort’s	notion	of	the	’people-as-one’.	
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position	that	Loughlin	intentionally	adopts	but,	rather,	a	consequence	of	the	epistemological	premises	of	the	theory.	The	political	remains	subservient	to	the	scientific	rationality	of	the	theory	when	the	metapolitical	alternative	would	have	been	to	regard	science,	including	Loughlin’s	own	theory,	as	one	divided	and	’divisive’	element	among	others	on	the	political	stage.		
The	polemical	intervention	Jacques	Rancière	addresses	the	relationship	between	politics	and	the	disciplines	that	study	it	in	more	open	terms.37	He	begins	his	book	Disagreement	with	a	hypothesis	that	‘what	is	called	“political	philosophy”	might	well	be	the	set	of	reflective	operations	whereby	philosophy	tries	to	rid	itself	of	politics,	to	suppress	a	scandal	in	thinking	proper	to	the	exercise	of	politics’.38	This	scandal	does	not	concern	merely	philosophy	in	the	narrow	sense	but	all	‘disciplines’	dealing	with	political	phenomena.	In	order	to	test	his	hypothesis,	Rancière	must	then	differentiate	something	that	can	be	specified	as	‘politics’	distinguishing	it	from	all	that	is	normally	called	by	that	name	but	for	which	Rancière	famously	reserves	the	term	‘police’.		The	distinction	itself	is	well	covered	ground,	but	let	us	simply	remind	ourselves	that	for	Rancière	’police’	includes	such	phenomena	as	legislative	acts,	court	decisions,	initiatives	by	ministries	and	other	governmental	bodies,	as	well	as	public	administration,	or,	to	put	it	in	a	single	’metaphorical	condensation’,	government.	As	with	Michel	Foucault’s	(clearly	related)	notion	of	governmentality,39	Rancière’s	government	by	‘police’	does	not	necessarily	imply	a	pejorative	quality	—	’police’	can	deliver	worthy	objectives	such	as	education,	public	health	and	social	security	—	but	it	refers	to	a	certain	rationality	of	government:		
																																																																				37	See	also	Paul	Bowman	and	Richard	Stamp	(eds),	Reading	Rancière	
(Continuum:	London,	2011),	Jean-Philippe	Deranty	(ed),	Jacques	Rancière.	Key	
concepts	(Acumen:	Durham,	2010),	Todd	May,	The	Political	Thought	of	Jacques	
Rancière.	Creating	Equality	(Edinburgh	University	Press:	Edinburgh,	2008)	38	Rancière,	Disagreement,	at	xii.	On	Rancière’s	politics,	see	also	Jacques	Rancière,	Hatred	of	Democracy	(Steve	Corcoran	trans.,	Verso:	London,	2006)	and	Jacques	Rancière,	On	the	Shores	of	Politics	(Liz	Heron	trans.,	Verso:	London,	2007).	39	Elaborated	in	particular	in	Michel	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population:	
Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France,	1977-1978	(Graham	Burchell	trans.,	Palgrave	Macmillan:	Basingstoke,	2007)	and	Michel	Foucault,	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics:	
Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France,	1978-1979	(Graham	Burchell	trans.,	Palgrave	Macmillan:	Basingstoke/New	York,	NY,	2008).	On	Rancière’s	assessment	of	the	affinities,	see	Rancière,	Disagreement,	at	28-29.	
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The	police	is	thus	first	an	order	of	bodies	that	defines	the	allocation	of	ways	of	doing,	ways	of	being,	and	ways	of	saying,	and	sees	that	those	bodies	are	assigned	by	name	to	a	particular	place	and	task;	it	is	an	order	of	the	visible	and	the	sayable	that	sees	that	a	particular	activity	is	visible	and	another	is	not,	that	this	speech	is	understood	as	discourse	and	another	as	noise.40		So	how,	then,	is	government	by	‘police’	different	from	the	‘real	thing’?	In	his	‘sixth	thesis’,	Rancière	describes	two	ways	of	‘counting’	or	of	‘accounting	for’	the	parts	that	make	up	a	community.	The	first,	that	is,	‘police’,	considers	only	‘real’	groups	as	they	are	defined	by	differences	in	their	‘functions,	places	and	interests’	accounting	for	the	entire	social	body	and	excluding	the	possibility	of	any	remnant	or	supplement.	One	can	hardly	avoid	hearing	a	certain	echo	of	Lefort’s	notion	of	totalitarianism	here.41	The	second	way	of	counting,	that	is,	‘politics’,	is	a	way	of	disrupting	the	seemingly	totalizing	nature	of	‘police’.	‘Politics’	counts	‘a	part	of	those	without	part’.42	It	is	worth	noting	how	Rancière’s	reference	to	‘counting’	and	‘accounting	for’	resonates	with	the	rationality	of	scientific	enquiry.	Government	by	‘police’	accounts	for	the	social	body	as	the	sum	total	of	its	constituent	parts	and	their	respective	qualifications.43	In	other	words,	government	by	‘police’	represents	a	way	of	counting	that	excludes	the	possibility	of	any	remainder.	All	and	everything	must	be	accounted	for.	As	a	symbolic	constitution	of	the	social	order,	the	principle	of	‘police’	is	equivalent	to	‘the	absence	of	void	and	of	supplement’.44	‘Politics’,	on	the	other	hand,	in	Rancière’s	terms,	is	the	disruption	of	the	social	order	that	government	by	‘police’	represents.	Because	an	order	built	on	the	principle	of	‘police’	is	hierarchical	by	nature,	it	is	based	on	relations	of	inequality	that	both	constitute	and	legitimate	the	social	order	as	a	form	of	domination.	The	principle	of	‘politics’,	by	contrast,	is	equality,	and	it	furnishes	the	logic	for	disruptive	interruptions	into	the	workings	of	government	by	‘police’:		The	essence	of	politics	consists	in	disturbing	this	arrangement	by	supplementing	it	with	a	part	of	those	without	part,	identified	with	the	whole	of	the	community.	Political	dispute	is	that	which	brings	politics	into	being	by																																																																					40	Rancière,	Disagreement,	at	29.	41	On	the	similarities	and	differences,	see	e.g.	Oliver	Marchart,	'The	Second	Return	of	the	Political:	Democracy	and	the	Syllogism	of	Equality',	in	Paul	Bowman	and	Richard	Stamp	(eds),	Reading	Rancière	(Continuum:	London,	2011)	129-147,	at	129-133.	42	Jacques	Rancière,	'Ten	Theses	on	Politics',	in	Jacques	Rancière,	Dissensus.	
On	Politics	and	Aesthetics	(Steven	Corcoran	trans.,	Continuum:	London,	2009)	27-44,	at	36	43	Rancière,	'The	Subject	of	the	Rights	of	Man',	at	70.	44	Rancière,	'Ten	Theses',	at	36.	
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separating	it	from	the	police,	which	causes	it	to	disappear	continually	either	by	purely	and	simply	denying	it	or	by	claiming	political	logic	as	its	own.	Politics,	before	all	else,	is	an	intervention	in	the	visible	and	the	sayable.45		This	is	all	well	covered	ground.	But	the	contrast	illuminates	something	essential	about	Loughlin’s	theory.	In	his	response	to	Emilios	Christodoulidis’s	criticism	of	The	Idea,	Loughlin	himself	takes	up	Rancière	because	he	feels	that	there	is	a	certain	kinship	with	the	arguments	put	forward	by	Christodoulidis.46	In	a	(very	insufficient)	nutshell,	Christodoulidis	claims	that	in	reading	Schmitt,	Loughlin	mistakenly	draws	from	the	friend-enemy	distinction	and	the	autonomy	of	a	‘first	order’	of	the	political	a	‘second	order’,	as	the	governing	that	regulates	the	social	conflicts	inherent	in	political	life.47	Christodoulidis’s	metapolitical	point,	as	I	see	it,	is	that	in	order	to	remain	political	in	Schmitt’s	polemical	meaning	of	the	word,	Loughlin’s	‘second	order’,	that	is,	the	management	of	social	conflicts	through	government,	must	rest	on	the	same	distinction	as	the	‘first	order’.	In	other	words,	the	governmental	pacification	of	social	conflicts	must	itself	be	seen	as	part	of	a	’social	conflict’.	Loughlin’s	riposte	is	that	whatever	the	merits	of	Christodoulidis’s	claims,	the	criticism	misses	its	mark	and	serves	more	as	a	justification	for	the	critic’s	own	’revolutionary	politics’.	Now	drawing	on	Rancière,	Loughlin	readily	admits	that	
The	Idea	had	no	intention	of	engaging	in	the	radical	politics	of	justice,	freedom	or	equality	but	that	’it	tries	to	explain	the	ways	in	which,	through	instituted	order,	these	terms	are	played	out’.48	And	so	Loughlin	can	conclude	that	’for	those	who	adhere	to	the	possibility	of	a	revolutionary	politics	being	realised,	the	word	”politics”	in	the	book	can	be	replaced	by	the	term	”the	police”	without	any	loss	of	cogency	in	its	argument’.49	The	tone	of	Loughlin’s	counterargument	seems	unnecessarily	defeatist	because	it	does	not	take	the	challenge	on	but,	rather,	withdraws	into	its	own	comfort-zone.	And	here	again,	I	think	that	he	does	not	fully	appreciate	the	meaning	of	the	question	regarding	the	theory’s	metapolitical	qualifications.	This	issue	becomes	clearer	if	we	contrast	Rancière’s	point	to	a	less-known	article	that	he	has	written	on	his	’method’.	There	Rancière,	writing	about	himself	in	the	third																																																																					45	Rancière,	'Ten	Theses',	at	36-37.	46	Although	the	observation	may	be	plausible,	Christodoulidis	does	not,	in	fact,	deal	with	Rancière	in	this	instance.	See	however	Emilios	Christodoulidis,	'Against	Substitution:	The	Constitutional	Thinking	of	Dissensus',	in	Martin	Loughlin	and	Neil	Walker	(eds),	The	Paradox	of	Constitutionalism.	Constituent	
Power	and	Constitutional	Form	(Oxford	University	Press:	Oxford,	2007)	189-209.	47	Christodoulidis,	'Public	Law	as	Political	Jurisprudence',	at	41-42.	This	distinction	is	made	in	Loughlin,	The	Idea,	at	37-42.	48	Loughlin,	'Reflections',	at	62.	49	Loughlin,	'Reflections',	at	62.	
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person,	defines	’method’	in	a	Heideggerian	sense	as	a	path.	Not	as	a	path	that	one	follows	but,	rather,	as	the	path	that	one	has	to	carve	out	in	order	to	show	’how	idealities	are	materially	produced’.50	Rancière	characterises	this	approach	as	one	that	does	not	produce	’theories	of’	but,	rather,	’interventions	on’:		They	are	polemical	interventions.	This	does	not	only	mean	that	they	take	a	political	stance.	This	means	that	they	imply	a	polemical	view	of	what	ideas	are	and	do.51			And	further	on,	he	presents	democracy	as	such	a	polemical	idea:		’Democracy’	is	not	the	concept	of	a	form	of	power	that	has	been	betrayed	or	misinterpreted.	It	was,	from	the	very	beginning,	the	object	of	a	struggle.	Democracy	was	invented	as	a	polemical	name,	designating	the	unthinkable	power	of	the	multitude	of	those	who	have	no	qualification	for	governing.	…	To	speak	of	democracy,	this	means	to	speak	of	the	struggle	about	the	word,	to	draw	the	map	of	a	battlefield.52		Rancière	does	not,	then,	dismiss	this	idea	of	a	’method’,	as	reducing	his	work	to	’revolutionary	politics’,	which	was	the	gist	of	Loughlin’s	riposte	to	Christodoulidis.	If	a	political	phenomenon	like	democracy	is	polemical	by	nature,	then	any	’scientifically’	motivated	approach	worth	its	name	will	by	necessity	’intervene’	in	the	struggles	that	make	up	the	phenomenon	itself.	There	is	no	’external’	scientific	position	available	in	relation	to	a	political	phenomenon.	Preferring	to	stay	in	the	background,	the	author	of	Foundations	tries	to	avoid	making	this	intervention	explicit.	But	we	can,	once	again,	detect	flirtations	with	the	metapolitical	position	in	Loughlin’s	more	recent	work.	He	will,	for	example,	be	well	aware	of	Schmitt’s	argument	that	even	an	epistemologically	veiled	claim	about	the	disinterested	position	of	the	scientist	—	e.g.	any	claim	to	a	’pure	theory’	—	is	in	itself	a	polemical	challenge	because	it	asserts	a	superiority	in	relation	to	the	allegedly	partisan	position	that	is	being	challenged.53	This	will,	then,	apply	logically	even	to	Schmitt’s	own	definition	of	politics	regardless	of	whether	he	openly	professes	it	or	not.	And	although	Loughlin	is	still	unwilling	to	fully	embrace	the	consequences	of	this	position	for	his	own	work,	the	arguments	for	developing	a	’metapolitics	of	public	law’	are	clearly	there.																																																																					50	Jacques	Rancière,	'A	Few	Remarks	on	the	Method	of	Jacques	Rancière',	15	
Parallax	(2009)	114-123,	at	114.	51	Rancière,	"Method",	at	116.	52	Rancière,	"Method",	at	116.	53	Schmitt,	The	Concept	of	the	Political,	at	65-66.	Cf.	Loughlin,	'Politonomy'.	
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Tragic	metapolitics	My	point,	to	conclude,	has	been	that	Foundations	starts	off	with	an	impossible	task,	namely	to	present	a	scientific	theory	of	a	political	phenomenon.	Instead	of	looking	deeper	into	this	strained	relationship,	Loughlin	attempts	to	reconcile	the	antinomy	with	a	form	of	practical	reasoning	that	he	calls	’government’.	As	such,	it	satisfies	neither	the	criteria	of	rigorous	science	in	the	Kantian	sense	that	Loughlin	frequently	alludes	to,	nor	the	criteria	of	politics,	if	he	chooses	to	align	himself	with	his	Schmittian	sources	of	inspiration.	I’ve	further	tried	to	argue	that	in	his	more	recent	work	Loughlin	is	beginning	to	approach	the	antinomy	in	new	ways,	which	would	suggest	a	rethinking	of	the	place	of	politics.	Loughlin’s	dilemma	is,	of	course,	very	similar	to	Max	Weber’s.	But	while	Weber	attempted	to	clarify	the	nature	of	the	abyss	that	separated	the	scientist	from	all	political	commitments,	Loughlin	is,	perhaps,	too	quick	to	bridge	that	gap.	And	in	that	sense	Foundations	falls	short	of	its	aims.	I	have	suggested	that	in	Loughlin’s	work	after	Foundations	there	are	already	signs	of	a	’metapolitics	of	public	law’	that	would	allow	him,	if	not	to	resolve,	then	at	least	to	investigate	the	antimony	in	more	detail,	before	he	allows	it	to	sublate	dialectically.	As	it	now	stands,	however,	there	is	something	’tragic’	about	Loughlin’s	impasse.	In	an	introduction	to	the	Italian	edition	of	Weber’s	vocation	lectures,54	Massimo	Cacciari	notes	how,	for	Weber,	the	vocations	of	the	scientist	and	of	the	politician	are	in	open	conflict	with	one	another.	The	conflict	is	an	’insurmountable	contradiction’55	that	excludes	the	possibility	of	any	overriding	principle	that	would	unify	the	two.	Loughlin	tries	to	bridge	this	divide	with	reference	to	’prudence’	and	’practical	reason’.	The	Weberian	scientist’s	will	to	knowledge,	Cacciari	continues,	is	grounded	in	decision,	but	her	vocation	is	also	tragic	in	the	sense	that,	while	that	decision	cannot	be	inferred	from	values,	it	is	at	the	same	time	intrinsically	rooted	in	them.	In	answering	her	call,	the	scientist	takes	on	a	duty	to	pursue	’pure’	value-free	knowledge,	and	the	normative	nature	of	this	duty	aligns	her	with	the	politician.	Science	provides	judgements	based	on	the	observation	of	regularities,	but	it	cannot	choose	between	values	or	prioritize	them.	Unable	to	decide	between	values,	the	vocation	of	the	scientist	can	never	elevate	scientific	rationality	beyond	values:																																																																						54	Cacciari,	'Weber	and	the	Politician	as	Tragic	Hero',	originally	Massimo	Cacciari,	'Introduzione',	in	Max	Weber,	La	scienza	come	professione.	La	politica	
come	professione	(Oscar	Mondadori:	Milano,	2006)	v-lx.	55	Cacciari,	'Weber	and	the	Politician	as	Tragic	Hero',	at	207.	The	analogy	to	Loughlin’s	starting	point	is	worth	noting	here.	
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Even	the	scientist	decides,	but	he	decides	to	understand	the	struggle	of	values	without	taking	part	in	it	for	anyone,	in	the	exercise	and	within	the	limits	of	his	own	research.	However,	in	already	undertaking	a	research	he	has	decided,	and	therefore	his	relation	to	other	vocations	is	a	priori,	original.	A	relation	without	confusion,	absolute	distinction	without	separation.56		The	Weberian	politician,	on	the	other	hand,	specifically	deals	with	values,	promoting	the	ones	that	she	has	chosen.	But	in	their	opposing	positions	on	values,	the	scientist	and	the	politician	are	not	enemies	in	the	polemical	sense,	one	that	would	include	the	destruction	of	the	adversary	as	an	end.	The	one	is	required	to	’tolerate’	the	other.	For	Cacciari,	this	polarity	or	irresolvable	antinomy	between	science	and	politics	is	what	defines	the	tragic	nature	of	Weber’s	modernity.	And	I	have	suggested	that	Loughlin’s	Foundations	—	the	theory	rather	than	the	book	—	is	tormented	by	a	similar	antinomy	and	that	his	attempts	at	resolving	it	are	insufficient.	In	Cacciari’s	account,	Weber’s	two	protagonists,	the	scientist	and	the	politician,	occupy	two	different	citadels	that	are	incompatible	with	one	another.	The	conflicting	relationship	between	the	two	is	a	stasis,	historically	connected	in	their	origins,	and	yet	continuously	perplexed	by	one	another,	a	’brotherly	enmity	between	the	city	of	science	and	the	city	of	politics’.57	It	is	tragic	enmity	because	no	battle	can	assume	annihilation	as	its	end.	No	science	can	overcome	the	antinomy:	’The	antinomy	has	no	other	choice	than	that	of	being	understood.’58	I	have	suggested	that	in	Loughlin’s	case	a	’metapolitics	of	public	law’	may	provide	a	starting	point	for	such	an	understanding.				
																																																																				56	Cacciari,	'Weber	and	the	Politician	as	Tragic	Hero',	at	211.	57	Cacciari,	'Weber	and	the	Politician	as	Tragic	Hero',	at	213.	58	Cacciari,	'Weber	and	the	Politician	as	Tragic	Hero',	at	212.	
